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Relief Pursuant to the Convention
Against Torture: A Framework for
Central American Gang Recruits and
Former Gang Members to Fulfill the
"Consent or Acquiescence"
Requirement
I. INTRODUCTION
Maras1 have challenged the stability of the post-conflict
governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and
tormented the civilian population. Given its effect on U.S.
immigration policies, the proliferation of gang violence in these
nations has been at the focal point of U.S.-Central American
relations. 2 In the past few years, the U.S. has experienced a sharp
and unprecedented increase in the number of petitioners from
these Central American nations who cite endemic gang violence as
the basis for refugee status.3 These claims however, have been
overwhelmingly denied, especially at the appellate level. 4 Most
petitioners seek relief through three separate remedies: asylum,
withholding of deportation, and the Convention Against Torture
(hereinafter "CAT' or "Convention"). This comment will argue
1. Mara is a Central American Spanish slang term for a gang.
Throughout the comment the terms "mara(s)" and "gang(s)" will be used
interchangeably.
2. See L.A. Summit Seeks To Sever International Gang Ties, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 7, 2007, available at http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/02/07/
gang.summit.ap/index.html.
3. N.C. Aizenman, More Immigrants Seeking Asylum Cite Gang
Violence: Applications from Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Guatemalans Have
Nearly Doubled, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2006, at A8.
4. See id. The number of applications increased from 7,000 in 2004 to
13,000 in 2006, but only 721 were granted in 2005. Id.
308
CONSENT OR ACQUIESCENCE
CAT provides a potentially more successful alternative to asylum
and withholding of deportation for Central American claimants
seeking relief from gang violence in their home countries. This
comment will further suggest a manner in which immigration
judges and appellate courts should address these claims by
considering relevant country conditions in these three nations,
and how these conditions impact the individual claimant.
Part II will address the sources and effects of the problem of
gang violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Part III
will describe two possible remedies, asylum and withholding of
deportation, for claimants seeking relief from this rampant
violence, and present the obstacles faced by Central American
claimants in seeking these remedies. Part IV will describe relief
pursuant to the Convention and present arguments as to why
CAT may be a worthwhile alternative to both asylum and
withholding of deportation. Part V will present portraits of both
the claim of a Central American gang recruit and the claim of a
former gang member, and suggest a manner in which immigration
judges and reviewing appellate courts should assess these claims
in light of the unique country conditions that exist in each of these
three nations. Finally, Part VI will address additional policy
considerations.
II. ENDEMIC GANG VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND
HONDURAS: ITS ROOTS AND EFFECTS
Undoubtedly, gang violence is one of the primary issues
impeding social and economic growth in the post-conflict nations
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. This section will
describe the problem of gang violence in each of these three
nations.
A. El Salvador
El Salvador signed the Peace Accords 5 in 1992, ending years
5. The Peace Accords were signed by the El Salvadoran Government
and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a guerilla
organization. The Accords were brokered by the United States. See U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT'L. DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT
ANNEX 1: EL SALVADOR PROFILE (2006) [hereinafter USAID STUDY: EL
SALVADOR].
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of civil war.6 Despite this remarkable landmark, violence, the
majority of which is attributed to the dominance of maras, has
emerged as an impediment to peace, stability, and the nation's
prospects for economic and social recovery after years of civil
conflict. Mara Salvatrucha 13 (also known as MS-13) and Mara
18, the two most prominent gangs in the nations profiled in this
comment, have their roots in the streets of Los Angeles,
California. 7 Both of the gang names symbolize Los Angeles street
names where the gangs originated, their ranks filled by
Salvadorans that fled to the U.S. during the civil war. 8
After the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992, the U.S. began
a deportation policy that resulted in the return of thousands of
Salvadorans to their homeland. 9  The deportation of gang
members, coupled with a government that had only just begun to
recover from years of civil war, created an environment ripe for
proliferation of the gang culture that developed from the streets of
Los Angeles and the California prison system. One commentator
writes:
The Central American republics are laden with poverty and
have histories of armed conflict. The broken family structures,
violent childhoods, abject poverty, and large black market of left
over war caliber weapons which allow MS-13 to flourish in El
Salvador exist throughout Central America. Deportation places
Mara Salvatrucha in a position to arm itself, recruit thousands of
new members, establish cells across international borders, and kill
thousands of innocent victims. It should be no surprise that Mara
Salvatrucha is now a threat in Honduras, Guatemala, Panama,
Costa Rica, and Mexico. 10
Several authors have been critical of the U.S.'s deportation
policy, arguing that the U.S. is aggravating the problem in El
Salvador. 11 Despite condemnation from human rights groups and
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Juan Fogelbach, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti Mara:
El Salvador's Struggle To Reclaim Social Order, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 223,
252 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Fogelbach, supra note 10; Ellen Padilla, Congress and
Courts Challenged by Two-Way Flow of Gang Violence and Asylum Seekers,
20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 163 (2005). This issue will be addressed more
CONSENT OR ACQUIESCENCE
other activists, deportation of known Salvadoran gang members
continues to be the U.S.'s policy.
12
It is estimated there are as many as 40,000 members of MS-
13 and Mara 18 in El Salvador. 13 The homicide rate is 40 per
100,000, and the El Salvadoran Government attributes 40% of
these homicides to gang-related killings. 14 Gang recruitment is
perpetuated by aggressive and often violent means and by the lure
of the gang lifestyle in the face of disparate income inequality,
lack of educational opportunities, and unemployment. Petitioners
for asylum claim gang activities, and the threat of violence affects
them everyday of their lives. 15 Males as young as fifteen live in
fear of recruitment techniques including threats to their families
and physical violence. 16 Also, gang members who seek to leave
the gang are threatened with their lives. 17 Finally, although the
majority of petitioners are male, women too live in fear of rape
and beatings at the hands of gang members that rule with
impunity.18
Gang activities have consequences national in character.
Rampant violence and upheaval caused by the dominance of the
Maras has resulted in the deterrence of much needed foreign
investment. 19 Governmental responses to gang violence,
including violent crackdowns and "dragnet" techniques, have led
to a mistrust of the police force and government that threatens the
nation's already fragile transition into democracy. 20 Thus, besides
terrorizing the civilian population, gang activities have stifled the
post-conflict transition of El Salvador into a politically and
comprehensively later in this comment.
12. See, e.g., Fogelbach, supra note 10, at 224-25.
13. See USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5.
14. See id.; The homicide rate in the U.S. is 5.7 per 100,000. U.S.
AGENCY FOR INT'L. DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG ASSESSMENT
ANNEX 2: GUATEMALA PROFILE (2006) [hereinafter USAID STUDY:
GUATEMALA].
15. See, e.g., Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005); Menjivar
v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2005); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d
228 (4th Cir. 2004).
16. See, e.g., Escobar, 417 F.3d at 364; Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 230.
17. See, e.g., Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003).
18. See, e.g., Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).
19. See USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5.
20. See id. Criticisms of these governmental responses by international
human rights groups will be addressed later in this comment infra Part VI.
2008] 311
312 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:308
economically stable democracy.
B. Guatemala
After thirty-six years of civil conflict, Guatemala signed the
Peace Accords 21 in 1996, but "the transition from war to peace has
not been a painless passage and peace continues to remain
elusive." 2 2 The homicide rate in Guatemala is 35 per 100,000,
which is slightly but not significantly lower than that of El
Salvador.2 3 The country's most notorious gang is MS-13. The
emergence of MS-13 in Guatemala has been attributed to the
spread of the gang culture from El Salvador to neighboring
Guatemala and Honduras, and U.S. deportation policies. 24 While
MS-13 boasts the largest gang membership in Guatemala, Mara
18 (called Barrio 18 in Guatemala) also has a presence in the
nation. 25  The United States Agency for International
Development Study ("USAID Study") points to several factors
which have contributed to the problem of gang proliferation in
Guatemala: marginal urban enclaves; large numbers of
uneducated and unemployed youth; poverty and income
inequality; minimal state presence; drugs; U.S. deportation
policies; and an ineffective judicial system. 2 6
The national effects of gang activities in Guatemala include:
deterred trade and investment; privatization of security;
stigmatization and victimization of youth; reduced faith in
democracy; institutional and extra-judicial violence; and
oversaturated, counter-productive prisons.27
C. Honduras
While civil wars raged in El Salvador and Guatemala,
Honduras was involved in civil strife with neighboring
21. USAID STUDY: GUATEMALA, supra note 14. The Peace Accords were
signed by the Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (GNRU), a guerilla organization. These Accords, like
those signed between the El Salvador Government and its guerilla
opposition, were brokered by the United States. Id.
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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Nicaragua. 28 The signing of the Peace Accords by Honduras'
neighbors was viewed as a turning point for the Central American
nation once considered a repressive government with a long
history of human rights abuses. 29  Complete political and
economic reformation, however, still seems to elude the nation.
Honduras is one of the poorest nations in the region, 30 and thus,
has become a fertile breeding ground for the gang violence that
plagues its neighbors. In 1999, Honduras had a homicide rate of a
shocking 154 per 100,000. 3 1 In recent years this number has
fallen, but the rate remains 46 in 100,000, higher than both El
Salvador and Guatemala. 32 Violence amongst youth in Honduras
remains the worst in Central America. MS-13 and Mara 18 are
both deeply entrenched in Honduran society, a problem
exacerbated by U.S. deportation policies. Many of the causes and
effects of gang violence felt in Honduras mirror those felt by its
neighbors, Guatemala and El Salvador.
III. AVENUES OF RELIEF IN THE UNITED STATES
There are three remedies a petitioner may seek in applying
for relief in the United States from conditions in their home
country: (1) asylum; (2) withholding of deportation; and (3) relief
pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. The first two
remedies, and the challenges faced by petitioners seeking relief
from gang violence in Central America through these remedies,
will be discussed in this section.
A. Asylum: The Most Coveted Form of Relief
A petitioner granted asylum will receive benefits including
legal immigration status,33 work authorization,3 4 the ability to
bring a spouse or child into the country 35 and, after one year, the
28. See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L. DEV., CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO GANG
ASSESSMENT ANNEX 3: HONDURAS PROFILE (2006) [hereinafter USAID STUDY:
HONDURAS].
29. Id.
30. Id. The per capita income is a mere 800 U.S. dollars. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2007).
34. Id. § 1158(c)(1)(B).
35. Id. § 1158(b)(3).
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opportunity to change their status from refugee to permanent
resident.36 An asylum seeker must prove he is a refugee, defined
as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. 37
Thus, an asylum applicant must demonstrate he is unable or
unwilling to return to his home country because of a well-founded
fear 38 of persecution on account of one of the five statutory
grounds. 39
Meeting the asylum requirement has proven nearly
insurmountable for petitioners from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras who seek relief from gang violence. 40 Although asylum
petitioners from these three nations can usually satisfy the
requirement that their fear of persecution at the hands of gangs
be "well-founded,"41 their claims have been denied because they do
not fit comfortably into one of the five statutorily enumerated
36. Id. § 1159(a)(1).
37. Id. § 1101(42)(A); see also Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C.A. § 101(42)(A) (2007).
38. There are four elements in evaluating the "well-founded fear": (1) the
applicant possesses a characteristic or belief that a persecutor seeks to
overcome in others through some form of punishment; (2) the persecutor is
aware, or could be aware, that the applicant possesses this belief or
characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the
applicant; and (4) the persecutor has an inclination to punish the applicant.
See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987); see also In re
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 226 (B.I.A. 1985).
39. See In re Sanchez, 19 I. & N. 276, 283 (B.I.A. 1985); see also INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992); INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 423, 428 (1987).
40. See, e.g., Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005);
Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2005); Escobar v. Gonzales, 417
F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2004);
Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003).
41. See Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 234.
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grounds. 42
Of the five statutorily protected grounds, petitioners from
these three nations can automatically eliminate race and
nationality from their argument for asylum, because gang
members within their home country (in almost every instance) are
members of the same race and nationality. Thus, petitioners are
left to claim their persecution is based upon their political
opinion(s), religion, or membership in a particular social group.
An anti-gang stance has been accepted as a political opinion by
the Ninth Circuit,4 3 however, this basis has been unanimously
rejected in the context of petitioners seeking asylum from gang
violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. 44 Claims
based upon religion have met similar obstacles.4 5 Therefore,
applicants from these three nations have relied upon their
membership in a particular social group. Indeed, one
commentator suggests membership in a particular social group is
the easiest way for these claimants to break through the
formidable asylum barrier erected by federal courts in this
country. 46
Membership in a particular social group, however, poses its
own set of problems for asylum seekers from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. 4 7  To prove membership in a
particular social group, a claimant must show: the existence of a
certain social group; their membership in this social group; and
that they have a well-founded fear of persecution based upon their
42. See id. at 235-37.
43. Nnachi-Anydiegwu v. Gonzales, 134 Fed. App'x. 171, 173-74 (9th Cir.
2005).
44. See Romero-Rodriguez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 131 Fed. App'x. 203, 205-06
(11th Cir. 2005) (applicant argued he was eligible for asylum because of his
political and religious anti-gang beliefs).
45. See id.
46. See Jeffrey D. Corsetti, Marked for Death: The Maras of Central
America and Those Who Flee Their Wrath, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 407, 422
(2006). Corsetti's comment discusses reasons why claims based upon political
opinion and religion have been denied, and argues membership in a
particular social group is a worthwhile avenue for these claimants to pursue
in seeking asylum.
47. See, e.g., Corsetti, supra note 46, at 422; Michele A. Voss, Young and
Marked for Death: Expanding the Definition of "Particular Social Group" in
Asylum Law to Include Youth Victims of Gang Persecution, 37 RUTGERs L.J.
235 (2005).
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membership in this social group (known as the "nexus
requirement"). 48 One of the immediate problems in this analysis
is there is not a uniform definition of "particular social group"
amongst the Circuits.49 The First,50 Third, 51 Fourth,52 Fifth, 53
Sixth,54 and Seventh 55 Circuits adopted the definition formulated
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.) in In re Acosta56:
[W]e interpret the phrase 'persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group' to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a
member of a group of persons all of whom share a
common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color,
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a
shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership... [W]hatever the common
characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that
the members of the group either cannot change, or should
not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences. 57
The Ninth Circuit adopted a broader interpretation defining
membership in a "particular social group" as a "voluntary
associational relationship,"58 but added in a preceding decision it
may also be based upon an "innate characteristic that is so
fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that
48. Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sharif v. INS,
87 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 1996)). This test was also adopted and applied by
the Third and Fourth Circuits. See, e.g., Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d
228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
49. This problem is at the core of Voss' note. See Voss, supra note 47, at
252. She calls for a uniform definition of "particular social group" to
ameliorate judicial review of asylum claimants seeking relief from gang
violence in their home country. See id.
50. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1990).
51. Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239-40.
52. Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft. 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004).
53. Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2002).
54. Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546 (6th Cir. 2003).
55. Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998).
56. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (B.I.A. 1985).
57. Id.
58. Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (this
definition was meant to include former association).
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members either cannot or should not be required to change it."59
The Second Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's view that
"particular social group" refers to 'a collection of people closely
affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common
impulse or interest,"' but has also noted members of a particular
social group must be externally distinguishable. 60  One
commentator suggests the absence of a uniform definition of
"particular social group" poses an obstacle to gang violence asylum
petitioners because the biases of immigration judges, arbitrariness
in decisions, and an inefficient use of the appellate process are the
natural results of this lack of uniformity. 61
An alternative and yet equally formidable problem to
claimants' reliance on membership in a particular social group is
that courts have been reluctant to grant asylum to claimants
whose relied upon social group is overly broad. Thus, claims
based upon membership in groups such as "tattooed youth,
62
"Honduran street children," 63 and "young men from a small town
in Guatemala where criminal gangs are present who refuse to join
the gang"64 have failed. A related problem is fulfillment of the
"nexus requirement," which requires the claimant to show their
persecution is based upon one of the statutory grounds: even
claimants that have presented a cognizable argument for their
membership in a particular social group, the most accepted being
membership in a nuclear family, may face denial if they cannot
show they were targeted by the gang because of their family
membership. 65 As the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Lopez-Soto v.
Ashcroft, petitioner Lopez-Soto was not targeted because of his
family, but rather because "he was a 16 year-old male living in...
59. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (the
Eighth Circuit has adopted this definition as well).
60. Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Sanchez-
Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576). In a recent decision, however, the Second Circuit
seems to repudiate its former interpretation of the scope of "particular social
group" in favor of the Acosta test adopted by the majority of the Circuits. See
Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2006).
61. See Voss, supra note 47, at 252-58.
62. Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
63. Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2005).
64. Santos-Davila v. Gonzales, No. 05-74360, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
28040, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 2006).
65. See Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 234-39 (4th Cir. 2004).
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Guatemala [where gang violence] has reached pandemic
proportions .... *"66 The Fourth Circuit rejected the nexus
between Lopez-Soto's family and his persecution at the hands of
gang members, instead favoring a large social group (young males
in Guatemala) which other Courts have shown a predilection to
reject.67
Therefore, relief in the form of asylum has eluded petitioners
from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras because they do not
fit comfortably into one of the five enumerated statutory grounds.
Although "membership in a particular social group" seems to be
the most promising avenue, interpretation disagreements
amongst the Circuits, judicial rejection of social groups that are
overly broad, and a petitioner's inability to satisfy the nexus
requirement have resulted in an overwhelming denial of these
claims.
B. Withholding of Deportation
A grant of withholding of deportation and relief under Article
3 of CAT 68 differ from a grant of asylum in two major respects: (1)
neither withholding of deportation nor relief pursuant to CAT
entitles a petitioner to legal immigration status (and the
coinciding opportunity to apply for permanent legal status within
one year),69 and (2) the court is not prohibited from deporting the
petitioner to a third country where the threat of persecution or
torture does not exist. 70 The Supreme Court has pointed out the
standard for proving withholding of deportation is even more
stringent than that which is required to prove a grant of asylum. 71
A petitioner applying for withholding of deportation must show
his "life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of
the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
66. Id. at 237.
67. See id.; See, e.g., Escobar, 417 F.3d at 367-68; Santos-Davila, 2006
U.S. App. LEXIS 28040, at *2-3.
68. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3, Apr. 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 114[hereinafter CAT art. 3]. Although the burden of proof required for
withholding of deportation and relief pursuant to Article 3 of CAT is
different, both result in relief in the form of withholding of deportation. Id.
69. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(b)(1)(i) (2007).
70. Id. § 208.16(f) (this relief is referred to as deferral of deportation).
71. See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
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social group, or political opinion."7 2 Thus, a reviewing court is
required to make an objective finding that the alien will "more
likely than not" be subject to persecution based upon one of the
five statutory grounds if forced to return to his or her home
country.73  Furthermore, upon making this finding, a stop
deportation order must be issued. 74 Because a petitioner need not
show it is "more likely than not" he will be persecuted if forced to
return to his home country when making an asylum claim, the
Supreme Court has noted the Attorney General has more
discretion in granting a claim of asylum than in granting a claim
of withholding of deportation.
7 5
Since courts have interpreted the standard for a grant of
withholding of deportation to be more stringent than that which is
required for a grant of asylum, most petitioners who are denied a
grant of asylum are subsequently denied a grant of withholding
deportation. This denial has been the trend in cases involving
petitioners from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who seek
relief from the gang violence that has overcome their home
lands.76
IV. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND
CAT AS AN ALTERNATIVE FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN PETITIONERS
Article 3 of CAT states, "[n]o State Party shall expel, return or
extradite a person toanother State where there are substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture."7 7 Courts have interpreted Article 3 of CAT
to mean a claimant may not be deported to a country where it is
"more likely than not" he would be tortured. 78 CAT, unlike
asylum or withholding of deportation, does not require a petitioner
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2007).
73. See Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430 (the reviewing court does not
make a subjective inquiry when assessing eligibility for withholding of
deportation, as it does for asylum in evaluating "well founded fear").
74. See id. at 449-50 (a grant of withholding of deportation is not
discretionary; it is mandatory if this objective finding is made).
75. See id.
76. See, e.g., Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 239 n.14 (4th Cir.
2004).
77. CAT art. 3, supra note 68, at 114.
78. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2007); see e.g., Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d
1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001).
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to base his claim on one of the five enumerated statutory grounds.
The Convention defines torture in the following manner:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture"
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 79
Thus, a cognizable CAT claim has two requirements. First,
the claimant must show that if he is forced to return to his home
country, then it is more likely than not that he will be subjected to
activity considered "torture" under the Convention's definition,
and second, that such "torture" would be inflicted "with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official."80
Interpretation of "consent or acquiescence" has been at the
center of CAT jurisprudence. 8 1 One interpretation of "consent or
acquiescence" was offered by the B.I.A. in In re S-V.82 The B.I.A.
noted, "[a] public official's acquiescence to torture 'requires that
the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.' '8 3 The B.I.A.
interpreted this provision to mean a petitioner must show
government officials are "willfully accepting" of the torture.8 4 The
79. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Apr. 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113-14
[hereinafter CAT art. 1]; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)-(7) (2007).
80. CAT art. 1, supra note 79, at 113-14; CAT art. 3, supra note 68, at
113-14; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (2007).
81. See, e.g., Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003); In re S-V,
22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (B.I.A. 2000).
82. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (B.I.A. 2000).
83. Id. at 1311 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)).
84. Id. at 1312.
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Court continued:
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture does not
extend protection to persons fearing entities that a
government is unable to control. In fact, the United
Nations Committee Against Torture stated that Article 3
does not provide protection in cases where pain or
suffering is inflicted by a nongovernmental entity that is
not acting by or at the instigation, consent, or
acquiescence of a public official.8
5
The standard of "willfully accepting" is a high bar for CAT
claimants. Under this standard, a claimant must show his home
government is both aware of the activity constituting torture, and
tolerates its occurrence. 86  This interpretation represents a
narrow construction of the Convention, which is detrimental to
claimants in all contexts.
Fortunately, Circuit courts confronted with interpretation of
"consent or acquiescence" have favored a broader and more
inclusive definition.8 7 In Zheng v. Ashcroft,88 the Ninth Circuit
rejected the B.I.A.'s interpretation of "consent or acquiescence,"
and instead articulated a standard more encompassing of the
plights of CAT claimants. The Court found the B.I.A.'s
interpretation to be in contravention of the legislative intent and
history of the Convention, stating, "B.I.A.'s interpretation of
acquiescence to require that government officials 'are willfully
accepting' of torture to their citizens by a third party is contrary to
clearly expressed congressional intent to requireonly 'awareness,'
and not to require 'actual knowledge' or 'willful[ accept[ance]' in
the definition of acquiescence."8 9 Therefore, "[t]he correct inquiry
as intendedby the Senate is whether a respondent can show that
public officials demonstrate 'willful blindness' to the torture of
their citizens by third parties, or as stated by the Fifth Circuit,
85. Id. at 1312-13.
86. Id. at 1312.
87. See, e.g., Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Lopez-
Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2004); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d
1186 (9th Cir. 2003); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341 (5th Cir.
2002).
88. 332 F.3d 1186.
89. Id. at 1188-89.
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whether public officials 'would turn a blind eye to torture."' 90 The
Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits were similarly persuaded by
this interpretation and have adopted this standard for the
evaluation of CAT Claims. 91
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the definition
of "consent or acquiescence" under CAT, the circuits uniformly
accepted the "willful blindness" standard.92 Thus, it is entirely
plausible for a CAT claimant to argue "willful blindness" is the
applicable test for determination of whether or not his home
government has consented or acquiesced to torture. One author
on the subject writes:
Given that several circuits have ...specifically endorsed a
broader reading of the consent or acquiescence requirement than
the B.I.A. or the Attorney General, and given that a broader
reading is more in keeping with the intent of the Senate and the
goals of the treaty ... the appropriate standard under which to
analyze the extent of government involvement is "willful
blindness" and not "willful acceptance. '93
Therefore, in addition to proving it is more likely than not he
will be tortured, a CAT claimant need only prove his home
government will demonstrate "willful blindness" to his torture.
Relief pursuant to CAT is a worthwhile alternative to asylum
and withholding of deportation for a petitioner seeking relief from
gang violence in Central America. As a preliminary matter, the
U.S. is reluctant to label the activities of countries with which it
maintains peaceful relations as "torture. '94 This policy could
create a problem for Central American gang members and gang
recruits. U.S. courts should recognize this approach does not
serve the interests of an individual CAT claimant and frustrates
the very purpose for which Article 3 of the Convention was
created: to prevent host countries from deporting claimants to a
country where they are likely to be tortured.
Part III of this comment examined the challenges faced by
90. Id. at 1196 (quoting Ontunez.Tursios, 303 F.3d at 355).
91. See Khouzam, 361 F.3d at 170; Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 240-41;
Ontunez-Tursios, 303 F.3d at 355.
92. See cases cited supra note 91.
93. Patricia J. Freshwater, The Obligation of Non-Refoulement Under the
Convention Against Torture: When Has a Foreign Government Acquiesced in
the Torture of Its Citizens? 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 585, 598-99 (2005).
94. CAT art. 1, supra note 79, at 113-14; Corsetti, supra note 46, at 430.
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these claimants in basing their claims upon one of the five
statutorily enumerated grounds (race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, and political opinion), as
required for both a petition for asylum and withholding of
deportation. Because CAT does not require claims to be based
upon one of the five statutorily enumerated grounds, it provides
an immediate advantage to Central American petitioners.
Furthermore, the Convention provides a broad definition of
torture.95 This broad definition bodes in favor of petitioners who
seek relief from gang violence in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras. Petitioners from these three nations, whether they be
gang recruits or former gang members, can demonstrate they were
tortured and will likely be tortured if forced to return to their
home country by showing evidence of either specific threats or
physical violence at the hands of gang members or government
officials. 96 Threats to the individual or the individual's family can
certainly qualify as a "mental" act causing "severe pain and
suffering."97 Physical violence in the forms of beatings or even
rape are almost certainly covered under Article l's definition of
torture.98 In fact, courts assessing CAT claims have conceded
petitioners from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, citing
gang violence as the basis of their claims, fulfill the "torture"
requirement. 99
Claimants, both from Central America and elsewhere, have
experienced greater difficulty in their fulfillment of CAT's second
requirement, proving their home governments "consent[ed] or
acquiesce[ed]" to the "torture."100 Fortunately for CAT claimants,
courts have agreed that a showing of "willful blindness" by the
95. CAT art. 1, supra note 79, at 113-14; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)-
(6) (2007).
96. The claimant, however, needs to prove more than just country-wide
torture. See, e.g., Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 552 (6th Cir.
2003); Corsetti, supra note 46, at 434.
97. See, e.g., Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2005); Lopez-
Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2004).
98. See, e.g., Menjivar, 416 F.3d at 918; Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 228.
99. The Fourth Court found it was not "disputed that it was more likely
than not that [petitioner] Lopez-Soto would be tortured if removed." See
Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 240.
100. Menjivar, 416 F.3d at 923; Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 240; CAT art. 3,
supra note 68; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (2007).
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claimant's home government is sufficient to demonstrate
governmental "consent or acquiescence" to their torture. 10 1 An
immigration judge's or an appellate court's understanding of the
relevant country conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras is imperative for a proper determination of whether or
not a CAT claimant seeking relief from gang violence in these
nations has met the "willful blindness" standard. Part V of this
comment will attempt to develop this framework.
V. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND APPELLATE COURTS TO ASSESS CENTRAL
AMERICAN CLAIMANTS' FULFILLMENT OF "CONSENT OR ACQUIESCENCE"
This section will include the facts and holding of two U.S.
Circuit Court opinions involving gang violence in Central
America: Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft,10 2 in which the claims of a gang
recruit from Guatemala were denied, and Castellano-Chacon v.
INS,10 3 in which the claims of a former gang member from
Honduras were denied. It will proceed by providing a framework
for which CAT claimants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras may show their home governments demonstrated
"willful blindness" to their torture at the hands of MS-13 or Mara
18. Although the analysis will be different for gang recruits and
former gang members, the central theme is that judicial
knowledge of relevant country conditions, and the degree of
specificity to which the claimant is able to link his claim to these
unique conditions, should be determinative of whether his CAT
claim succeeds or fails.
A. Portrait of a Gang Recruit: Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft
The story of Rutilio Lopez-Soto reflects the struggle a young
man endured at the hands of MS-13 or Mara 18, when he refused
to join their ranks. Lopez-Soto, a native of Guatemala,
encountered Mara 18 when the gang recruited his two brothers,
who both refused to join. 10 4 His brother, Edgar, was subsequently
101. See, e.g., Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Lopez-
Soto, 383 F.3d at 228; Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003);
Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 2002).
102. 383 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2004).
103. 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003).
104. Lopez-Soto, 383 F.3d at 231.
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stabbed to death by gang members, consistent with their "join or
die" mentality. 10 5  A police report was filed by the family,
complete with the names of the gang members who took part in
the killing; however, the perpetrators were never apprehended.106
When Lopez-Soto was sixteen he and his cousin were approached
by members of Mara 18 in a park and were told that they too
would be killed if they refused to join the gang. 10 7 After the
incident in the park, threats continued in the form of letters
mailed to his home. 108
In response, Lopez-Soto and his cousin, Elmer, decided to flee
to the U.S. 10 9 Lopez-Soto was fortunate enough to make it into
the U.S., his cousin however, was apprehended in Mexico and
killed by Mara 18 within a short time of his return to
Guatemala. 110 Lopez-Soto was detained by Immigration and
Naturalization Services, and at his deportation hearing, he
requested relief in the form of asylum, withholding of deportation,
and pursuant to CAT.111 The immigration judge denied relief,
which was affirmed upon appeal to the B.I.A., and later by the
Fourth Circuit. 112
With respect to Lopez-Soto's CAT claim, the Fourth Circuit
noted, "neither the IJ nor the B.I.A. disputed that it was more
likely than not that Lopez-Soto would be tortured if removed."113
Thus, the immigration judge and the B.I.A., with the Fourth
Circuit affirming, conceded Lopez-Soto had met the first
requirement of a cognizable CAT claim. The claim was denied
because:
While the record may show that, in the abstract, government
officials know of Mara 18's activities, and are generally unable to
stop them, it does not show - as Petitioner must - that local
government officials demonstrate "willful blindness" to the torture
of their citizens by third parties. Here, Lopez-Soto failed to make
the appropriate showing that the local officials were aware of, let
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 232.
109. Id.
110. Id. Elmer's brother was also killed by Mara 18. See id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 233, 241.
113. Id. at 240.
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alone willfully blind to, the harassment suffered by Petitioner, his
cousin Elmer, or other family members. 114
B. Framework for the Evaluation of a CAT Claimant Who is a
Gang Recruit
The burden of proving "consent or acquiescence" by showing
the government's "willful blindness" to the torture inflicted by
gangs is arguably more difficult for a gang recruit than it is for a
former gang member because El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras have created national policies against gangs and gang
violence.
In El Salvador, the Mano Dura (Firm Hand) and Super Mano
Dura (Super Firm Hand) are law enforcement approaches used to
curb gang violence in that nation. 115 Mano Dura and Super Mano
Dura allow the police to arbitrarily arrest youth suspected of being
gang members and place them in prison. 116 In Guatemala,
political pressure to combat the gangs has forced the government
to institute plans for joint police-military units to patrol and
arbitrarily detain suspects in crime-ridden parts of the country. 117
Unlike El Salvador and Honduras, Guatemala has not legitimated
its activities through legislation. 118 Like the Mano Dura and
Super Mano Dura legislation passed in El Salvador, Honduras'
Ley Anti-Maras is a "zero tolerance campaign against the maras
[which has] resonated with voters."119 The legislation creates a
low evidentiary standard for the conviction of suspected gang
members rounded up by the police. 120
Thus, it may appear these three nations have acted in such a
manner that proving "consent or acquiesce" of governmental
officials by showing their "willful blindness" to the plight of gang
recruits is virtually impossible. Courts confronted with CAT
claimants seeking relief from private torture at the hands of a
non-governmental party to which their home government is
114. Id. at 241.
115. See USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5. Super Mano Dura
resulted in the arrests of more than 11,000 gang members in just one year.
Id.
116. See id.
117. See USAID STUDY: GUATEMALA, supra note 14.
118. See id.
119. See USAID STUDY: HONDURAS, supra note 28.
120. See id.
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diametrically opposed have been denied relief under the
Convention. 121  A CAT claimant who can demonstrate the
presence of relevant factors which negate the national policies of
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras may still, however,
present a potentially successful claim. A showing of government
inefficiency and police corruption resulting in the proliferation of
gang violence in these nations, for example, might be a
worthwhile avenue for these claimants to pursue.
In El Salvador, "[t]he hard-line enforcement approach has not
had the desired effect of curbing gang violence. . . . [g]ang
membership seems to be rising despite frequent round-ups of gang
members." 122  The USAID Study found, "[t]here is a lack of
national coordination among the country's enforcement
institutions .... [t]he judiciary and police systems are saturated,
and there are not enough personnel in these systems to manage
the problem of gangs."'123 Similarly, the prison systems have done
more to sophisticate the gang culture than to rehabilitate the gang
members within its walls. 124 Gang violence has inundated the
police force and forced the government to retreat from certain
parts of the country. The USAID Study found, "[a]reas lacking in
social services and security, gangs become bolder, and may take
on roles normally reserved for the state."125 Furthermore, gangs
are a main conduit of narcotics and arms trafficking in the region
and thus, provide economic opportunities for police and other
government officials to profit at the expense of a civilian
population that longs for protection from the terror gangs
inflict. 126 One commentator put the situation in El Salvador in
harsh perspective:
121. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 183 (3d Cir. 2003) ("Lukwago
has not only failed to demonstrate that the Ugandan government acquiesces
in the Lord's Resistance Army's activities, but the evidence he submitted
shows that the Ugandan government and the LRA are in continuous
opposition").
122. See USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5.
123. See id.
124. See id. Salvadoran prisons are plagued with rampant violence and
drug use. Similarly, the Salvadoran prison system is an institution that
gangs use to coordinate their criminal enterprises. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. The USAID Study reports, "[t]here are unsupported claims
that the police are directly involved in illegal activities with gang members."
Id.
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El Salvador is incapable of containing Mara Salvatrucha.
Prisons are already overcrowded and rival gang members
cannot be housed in separate facilities. The country lacks
the financial resources and patience to do this. The police
are overburdened with common crime and cannot contain
the gang. The judicial system, with pressures from
abroad, has not favored necessary legislation aimed to
curtail gang activity.127
The situation in Guatemala is similar.128 The USAID Study
notes, "[t]he justice and security sectors are weak, corrupt,
overwhelmed, and neglected."'129 Like El Salvadoran prisons,
Guatemalan prisons are oversaturated and counter-productive:
"[P]risons have evolved into graduate schools or training camps
for gang members."'130 There is widespread frustration with the
Government's inability to provide even the most basic social
services, public security, and justice to its citizens given
"Guatemala suffers from the region's lowest public investment in
social services and lowest tax collection base from which to fund
these investments." 131  Furthermore, the corruption of
government officials in Guatemala is so pervasive that there is a
general sense of mistrust and fear of the police. In a 2004 survey,
over 70% of Guatemalans believe the police are directly involved
in criminal activity of some form or another. 132 The International
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), a
U.S. Department of Justice program aimed at training law
enforcement officials in foreign nations 133 found, "[t]he major
challenge to providing police development assistance in
Guatemala is the widespread corruption throughout the
government, including the police. Hand in hand with the
corruption problem goes the serious lack of political will on the
part of the Government of Guatemala."'134  Corruption has
127. Fogelbach, supra note 10, at 253.
128. See USAID STUDY: GUATEMALA, supra note 14.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. The tax collection base in Guatemala is less than 10% of Gross
Domestic Product. See id.
132. See id.
133. This program will be addressed more fully infra Part VI.
134. See Dep't of Just., International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program (ICITAP), ICITAP Project Overviews: Guatemala,
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naturally led to the under-reporting of gang violence in the forms
of beatings, rapes, and even murder. In Honduras, "[t]he Leys
Anti-Maras . . . has had mixed results."13 5  Like its Central
American neighbors, the country's national policy against gangs is
plagued by inefficiency and corruption. The prisons are an
especially serious problem for the Honduran government. 136
Therefore, a combination of widespread government
corruption and inefficiency has fueled the rise of gangs as "de facto
governments" of these three nations.13 7 Patricia Freshwater 13 8
writes that there are three "factors . . . relevant to an analysis of
the 'consent or acquiescence' prong of the Convention Against
Torture." These factors are: the presence of systematic deficiencies
in the governmental response to private torture; the involvement
of government officials in the torture; and whether or not the de
jure government is the de facto government. 139 Freshwater's
approach to the "consent and acquiescence" requirement of CAT
could be extremely useful to claimants from the nations of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. First, within these three
nations, there are systematic deficiencies in the national policies
against gang violence. These deficiencies include: a lack of
coordination among law enforcement, a lack of law enforcement
personnel, an inundated judiciary, and an oversaturated, counter-
productive prison system. Furthermore, given the widespread
corruption that exists in these three nations, there is evidence of
direct governmental involvement in gang activities. Police are
often involved in arms and narcotics trafficking and therefore, are
more willing to consent to gang violence. Finally, because of the
governments' failures to provide basic social services, there is
evidence gangs have assumed roles usually reserved for the state
in certain parts of these countries. Therefore, it is arguable gangs
are the de facto governments of certain regions.' 40 It would be
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap/guatemala.html.
135. USAID STUDY: HONDURAS, supra note 28.
136. See id.
137. See Corsetti, supra note 47, at 407.
138. See Freshwater, supra note 93, at 601.
139. See id. at 601-08.
140. Corsetti's CAT analysis is also helpful, but he fails to take into
account the national anti-gang policies present in each of these three nations.
He argues a CAT claimant seeking relief from gang recruiting (he does not
address the plight of a former gang member) could show "consent or
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erroneous however, to infer proof of country-wide deficiencies and
government corruption alone are sufficient in developing a
cognizable CAT claim. Courts have also rejected CAT claims
based solely upon a country's inability to combat violence because
of widespread corruption and inefficiency. 14 1 Thus, the challenge
is for the claimant to demonstrate specifically how the presence of
such factors affects his personal security.
A successful CAT claimant seeking relief from gang recruiting
techniques might show that despite the national policy against
gangs and gang violence he has been tortured by gangs for
refusing to join their ranks and the government has exhibited
"willful blindness" to this gang-inflicted torture. The claimant
would have to present specific, corroborative 142 evidence that one
or more of the following factors are at work in his home country
and especially, among local authorities: systematic deficiencies,
government corruption, or gangs as de facto governments. 143
Thus, a claimant such as Lopez-Soto might argue that despite the
national policy of Guatemala, he is likely to be tortured because
local authorities, even when provided with the names of the
culpable gang members, did not competently investigate the
murder of his brother. 144 The claimant might show evidence of an
acquiescence" by (1) a showing of the inability of the national government to
prevent acts of torture, and (2) a showing of the unwillingness of local
officials to do the same. In fulfillment of the "inability" requirement, he
points to several factors that contribute to the national problem of gang
violence including: "gang infiltration of governmental institutions," under-
funding of the criminal justice system, lack of a professional police force, and
the presence of too few police officers. In regards to the unwillingness prong,
he points to evidence of police corruption and police-gang collusion at the
local level. See Corsetti, supra note 47, at 431-33.
141. See Builes v. Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d 518, 525 (M.D. Pa. 2003) ("We do
not believe that evidence of widespread bribery, corruption and intimidation
of government officials, or of the government's powerlessness to prevent
torture, satisfies Petitioner's burden of showing acquiescence by the
government in torture").
142. Corroboration of claimant testimony may come in many forms. Of
those specifically endorsed by the courts, are family affidavits, affidavits of
expert witnesses, country and human rights reports, government documents,
police reports, newspaper articles, and the testimonies of similarly situated
persons. See, e.g., Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Zheng v.
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003); Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d
596 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
143. Freshwater, supra note 93, at 601-08.
144. See Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 231 (4th Cir. 2004).
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insufficient number of law enforcement personnel, a lack of
coordination between local law enforcement units, and other
systematic deficiencies. 145
In addition, a claimant such as Lopez-Soto might show he and
his family received specific threats from gang members and either
reported them to the police with no avail or made a conscious
decision not to report the incidents to the police because of the
systematic deficiencies aforementioned or even because they fear
police-gang collusion. 146 A great number of petitioners' claims are
denied on the basis that the petitioners did not report instances of
gang violence to the police. 147 Courts see this lack of reporting as
evidence of either fabrication of claims or a failure to exhaust their
home government of its modes of protection. 148 Courts, however,
should take into account the individual's own sense of the
government, combined with objective evidence of the
pervasiveness of government corruption and inefficiency. 149 Thus,
a determination of the claimant's fulfillment of the "consent or
acquiescence" requirement of a CAT claim should not rest on
whether or not the claimant reported the matter to the police,
especially if the claimant can show there exists police-gang
collusion or other factors present rendering such reporting futile.
The court should be open to receiving testimony from the claimant
himself about the prevalence of corruption among the authorities
in his locality and his sense trust (or mistrust) of local law
enforcement. Expert advice or government studies should
corroborate such testimony. 150
145. See id. This may include evidence of the number of law enforcement
personnel assigned to the case, the number of man hours worked, etc.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005); Menjivar
v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2005); Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d
1069 (9th Cir. 2005); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2004).
148. See cases cited supra note 147.
149. In Escobar, Escobar, a victim of gang recruitment techniques,
claimed "that the Honduran police failed to offer protection to street children
* . . like gang members, the police pressured him to steal on their behalf, and
threatened him if he refused." See 417 F.3d at 364. Likewise in Castro-Perez,
the claimant was raped by a notorious gang member and did not report the
rape to the police because she believed the police would not investigate. See
409 F.3d at 1070.
150. Thus, I am suggesting that a subjective inquiry, corroborated by
objective evidence, should be presented to the immigration judge.
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Therefore, this comment urges that immigration judges take
into account relevant factors 151 present in these three nations
that, in essence, negate the national policies against gangs and
gang violence. So long as evidence of these factors is presented in
a manner that is credible, corroborative, and specifically tailored
in a way so it is representative of the claimant's individual bases
for relief, the CAT claim should have a reasonable chance of
success.
C. Portrait of a Former Gang Member: Castellano-Chacon v. INS
Rolando Augustine Castellano-Chacon, a native of Honduras,
entered the U.S. illegally when he was sixteen-years-old. 152 While
living in New York at the age of eighteen, Castellano-Chacon
became a member of MS-13 and, as part of his initiation, received
tattoos on his chin, below his right eye, chest, back, both shoulders
and arms, and hands. 153 Castellano-Chacon eventually decided to
leave the gang "because of the violence of gang life and the fact
that so many members were 'going to jail for life.""'15 4 He re-
located to Maryland and then to North Carolina in an effort to
leave MS-13.155 While living in Ohio, he was arrested for a minor
infraction and served a 30-day jail term, during which he was
served with a Notice to Appear before the immigration judge. 156
At his deportation hearing, Castellano-Chacon claimed
asylum, withholding of deportation, and relief pursuant to CAT.157
Castellano-Chacon argued if he was returned to Honduras, he
would likely be tortured by the government because his tattoos
were an indication of his membership in MS-13.158 Castellano-
Chacon presented an expert witness who explained to the
immigration judge there had been a:
[S]teep increase in the number of extra-judicial murders
151. Including, but not limited to, the presence of systematic deficiencies,
government corruption, and the rise of gangs as de facto governments. See
Freshwater, supra note 93, at 601-08.
152. Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2003).
153. Id. at 538-39. Castellano-Chacon received all of his tattoos within a
one week period, receiving a few each day. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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committed by Honduran security forces and/or
paramilitary groups, specifically targeting young men
with tattoos, who were assumed to be gang members
involved in criminal activities . . .[and] the targeting of
gang members is seen by those in power in Honduras as a
'form of acceptablesocial cleansing.
Castellano faces the grave probability of death at the
hands of government forces due to his previous gang
affiliation and numerous tattoos.
159
The immigration judge denied Castellano-Chacon's claims
stating, in regards to his CAT claim, "although Castellano had
provided evidence of 'general violence,' he had not provided
sufficient evidence to demonstrate he would, 'more likely than
not,' be at risk of being tortured if he returned to Honduras."
160
The B.I.A. affirmed the decision of the immigration judge finding
Castellano-Chacon was not entitled to relief under CAT because
"'general conditions of violence and gross human rights violations
are not sufficient grounds for determining that a particular person
would be subjected to torture."' 161 The Sixth Circuit subsequently
affirmed this decision, denying his CAT claim because he failed to
provide specific evidence showing the likelihood of his torture.
162
D. Framework for Evaluation of a CAT Claimant Who is a
Former Gang Member
Article 3, § 2 of CAT provides that authorities assessing CAT
claims "shall take into account all relevant considerations
including ... the existence in the State concerned of a consistent
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights."'
16 3
Thus, a CAT claimant who has attempted to leave the gang may
have a stronger claim than that of the gang recruit, because there
is documented and widely-reported evidence of the hard-line
tactics the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
159. Id. at 540.
160. Id. at 541.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 552, 554.
163. See CAT art. 3, supra note 68; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2007).
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have used in their efforts to curb gang proliferation. These tactics,
including arbitrary arrests and extra-judicial killings by
government-sponsored death squads, have been criticized
vehemently by the international community. 164
In El Salvador, human rights groups reported the "arbitrary
detentions, torture, and extra-judicial executions" of suspected
gang members. 165 Guatemala's policies have come under even
greater scrutiny given the absence of anti-mara legislation
legitimating the law enforcement techniques used against gangs
in that country.166 Political pressure to stem the tide of gang
violence has created "an enabling environment for increased
institutional and extra-judicial violence."'1 67 In 2000, corpses of
gang members, identified as such by the presence of gang-related
tattoos, were discovered near Guatemala City with signs of torture
and violent death. 168 The government of Guatemala has been
criticized by the international community for taking part in a
"social cleansing operation" of suspected gang members. 169 Plans
for a joint police-military campaign against gangs have only
increased these concerns because such policies are reminiscent of
the country's years of civil war and government-sponsored torture
and violence. 170 Under Honduras' Ley Anti-Maras legislation,
"[y]ouths with tattoos on their bodies can be detained and
processed" on that basis alone. 171 Anti-mara "death squads" have
been known to patrol high crime neighborhoods at night,
searching for and detaining gang members, and then taking them
to the countryside where they are killed. 172  Therefore, the
implementation of Central American anti-gang policies constitutes
in and of itself grave human rights violations. The USAID Study
states, "[these governments have] received . . . accusations from
164. See, e.g., USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5; USAID STUDY:
GUATEMALA, supra note 14; USAID STUDY: HONDURAS, supra note 28.
165. See USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5.
166. See USAID STUDY: GUATEMALA, supra note 14.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See USAID STUDY: HONDURAS, supra note 28.
172. See Manuel Bermudez, Central America: Gang Violence and Anti-
Gang Death Squads, INTER PRESS NEWS SERVICE AGENCY, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30163.
CONSENT OR ACQUIESCENCE
human rights organizations of using social cleansing tactics or of
turning a blind eye to the use of such tactics by rogue elements in
the police force."
173
A former gang member, still covered in gang-related tattoos,
is a walking target for arbitrary arrest, detention, or even torture
and death. Thus, a claimant, such as Castellano-Chacon, who has
vowed to denounce his gang lifestyle, but remains covered in
tattoos, can plausibly demonstrate it is more likely than not he
will be tortured if forced to return to his home country.
Furthermore, the international community has noted the
governments of these three nations readily "consent or acquiesce"
to the torture of gang members. 174 Despite this showing, the
B.I.A. found, and the Sixth Circuit agreed, "'general conditions of
violence and gross human rights violations are not sufficient
grounds for determining that a particular person would be
subjected to torture."' 175
This rationale comports with other CAT decisions in which
the claimant was only able to show general country conditions
without specific evidence of how his individual claims are related
to these conditions. 176  Thus, courts require a more specific
showing of the country conditions and its effect on the personal
security of the claimant. If Castellano-Chacon was a former gang
member who resided in Honduras and had previously been
arrested, detained, or tortured by government officials his claim
would have been more successful. 177 CAT however, does not
173. See USAID STUDY: GUATEMALA, supra note 14 (emphasis added); see,
e.g., Fogelbach, supra note 10.
174. See USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5; USAID STUDY:
GUATEMALA, supra note 14; USAID STUDY: HONDURAS, supra note 28. The
"willful blindness" standard is clearly met when the government is actively
participating and sanctioning the torture.
175. Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 541 (6th Cir. 2003).
176. See, e.g., Perinpanathan v. INS, 310 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2002); Builes
v. Nye, 239 F. Supp. 2d 518 (M.D. Pa. 2003); Velasquez-Velasquez v. INS, 53
Fed. App'x. 359 (6th Cir. 2002); Chinchilla-Jimenez v. INS, 226 F. Supp. 2d
680 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The claimants relied on general country conditions
alone without showing specific harm.
177. See, e.g., Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Zheng v.
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2003); Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d
596 (E.D. Pa. 2003). These claimants showed past persecution or presented
more than just a generalized country claim in regards to the probability of
them being tortured upon returning.
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require a showing of past torture for a claimant to prove it is more
likely than not they will be tortured in their home country with
the consent and acquiescence of the home government.178
The Court in Castellano-Chacon indicated, "[i]f Castellano
had presented specific evidence in support of the contention that
the majority of persons similarly situated in terms of gang status
or tattoos were subject to torture, he might have made his
case."179  Given Castellano-Chacon's presentation of relevant
country conditions corroborated by expert testimony it would
appear as though he made this showing. 180 The Court however,
indicated Castellano's age (27) put him outside of the age range of
youths (23 and younger) with tattoos and other suspected gang-
related symbols who were arbitrarily arrested, detained, tortured,
or even killed. 181 The Court's distinction between a 23 year-old
with gang tattoos and a 27 year-old with tattoos seems attenuated
given the pervasiveness and well-documented nature of the
Honduran Government's response to gangs.18 2 It is worth noting
many commentators suggest reviewing courts are biased by
petitioners who participate in criminal activity while in the
United States. 8 3 Deportation of criminals is a well established
178. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2007). "In assessing whether it is more likely
than not that an applicant would be tortured in the proposed country of
removal, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture shall be
considered, including, but not limited to: (i) Evidence of past torture inflicted
upon the applicant; (ii) Evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of
the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured; (iii)
Evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the
country of removal, where applicable; and (iv) Other relevant information
regarding conditions in the country of removal." Id.
179. 341 F.3d at 552 (emphasis added).
180. See id. at 540-41.
181. See id. at 552.
182. The Court's conclusion that the government would only target gang
members under twenty-three is irrational and misplaced. Given the well-
documented nature of the "drag-net" tactics used by governmental officials in
these three nations, it defies logic to assert older gang members covered in
gang-related tattoos will be consciously excluded from arbitrary
governmental round-ups. Thus, putting aside the age distinction relied upon
by the Sixth Circuit, I would argue Castellano-Chacon provided sufficient
evidence that he was entitled to relief under CAT by showing that others
"similarly situated" have been tortured by the Honduran government.
183. I suggest the courts reviewing Castellano-Chacon's claims were
biased by the fact Castellano-Chacon was a known member of MS-13 who
had participated in criminal activity while in the United States. See, e.g.,
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immigration policy, despite the criticism it has received.1 8 4
In conclusion, former gang members, like gang recruits,
cannot rely solely on a showing of general country conditions that
might result in their torture. But by showing one's gang
affiliation has put others "similarly situated" at risk of torture at
the hands of the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras, a claimant should be able to prove both "torture" and
the "consent and acquiescence" of his home government.
Nevertheless, judicial bias, and U.S. immigration policies
advocating deportation of criminals may still create an obstacle to
such claims.
VI. POLICY CONCERNS: OTHER WAYS TO CURB GANG VIOLENCE IN
CENTRAL AMERICA
A. Criticism of U.S. Deportation Policies
Many commentators on the subject of gang violence in Central
America point to U.S. Deportation policies as being one of the root
causes of the problem. 18 5  Juan Fogelbach argues U.S.
Deportation of gang members is an "irrational policy," stating,
"[t]he United States should no longer shift the burden of
combating Mara Salvatrucha to El Salvador 1 86  [because]
Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law,
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115 (1999); Melissa Cook, Banished for Minor Crimes:
The Aggravated Felony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a
Human Rights Violation, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293 (2003); Valerie Neal,
Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune: The Deportation of 'Aggravated
Felons", 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1619 (2003). Note: Castellano-Chacon was
not convicted of an aggravated felony.
184. For more on deportation of criminals see, e.g., Bleichmar, supra note
183; Cook, supra note 183; Neal, supra note 183. For more on the deportation
of gang members and the criticism this policy has received see, e.g.,
Fogelbach, supra note 10, at 252-54 (Fogelbach suggests it is in the interest
of U.S. national security to keep gang members (including those with
criminal records) in the U.S., rather than deport them, which has been the
dominant policy of the U.S.); Padilla, supra note 11, at 164-65. This issue
will be addressed more comprehensively infra Part VI.
185. See, e.g., USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra note 5; USAID STUDY:
GUATEMALA, supra note 14; USAID STUDY: HONDURAS, supra note 28;
Fogelbach, supra note 10; Padilla, supra note 11.
186. Fogelbach's article focuses on El Salvador, but his claims can
certainly be applied to Guatemala and Honduras as well.
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[c]ontinued deportation is a threat to hemispheric and national
security."'187 Fogelbach views the U.S. policy of deporting gang
members as both an ineffective remedy to the U.S.'s own gang
problem, and as an exacerbation of the threat of gang violence in
Central America, which in turn could result in national security
concerns for the U.S.' 8 8 Thus, Fogelbach urges the U.S., "[a]s the
leader of the War on Terror," to "reconsider its flawed policy of
exporting Salvadorian-American gangs outside its borders."'189
Further, he advocates the U.S. take an "affirmative role" in
Central America's struggle to gain control over the problems
caused by gangs and gang violence by providing financial aid,
offering assistance in the training of Central America law
enforcement officials, and fostering international cooperation. 190
U.S. Courts have shown apprehension in extending protection
to claimants who have been gang members or taken part in other
forms of criminal activity while in the United States.' 91 There is a
tendency, when the opportunity presents itself, to deport a
criminal without fully considering the strength of his claim 192 or
the pervasiveness of the human rights violations in existence in
his home country. 193  In line with the arguments made by
187. Fogelbach, supra note 10, at 252.
188. He writes, "Deported gang members pose a greater threat to
American national security than those confined within its borders. Mara
Salvatrucha cannot be entirely deported because many members are either
U.S. born Latinos, or African-American; this assures that Mara Salvatrucha
will always exist in the United States. These members are often convicted of
criminal charges that pose little or no risk to the American population at
large. In contrast, deported MS-13 members established a network of gang
cells stretching from Panama to the United States. This chain is a threat to
national security because it can be used to smuggle automobiles, drugs, war
caliber weapons, and humans via the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. In fact,
U.S. intelligence already believes that al Qaeda has met with Mara
Salvatrucha. One concern is that al Qaeda may use MS-13 as a courier from
Central America to the U.S.-Mexico border, where illegal entry into the
United States will be inevitable." Id. at 253.
189. Id.
190. See id. at 254.
191. See, e.g., Bleichmar, supra note 183; Cook, supra note 183; Neal,
supra note 183. See also Fogelbach, supra note 10, at 252-54; Padilla, supra
note 11, at 164-65. I would argue this judicial apprehension is what occurred
in Castellano-Chacon. See 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003).
192. See, e.g., 341 F.3d 533. I suspect this may be behind the arbitrary
age distinction made by the Sixth Circuit in Castellano-Chacon.
193. Id.
CONSENT OR ACQUIESCENCE
commentators on the matter 194 this policy is irrational and
dangerous to regional security. The U.S. may benefit from
retaining claimants here who have made cognizable claims, rather
than favoring deportation as a means to rid our streets of the
problem given Central America's inability to deal with gangs such
as MS-13 and Mara 18.
B. U.S. Reponses to the Problem: ICITAP and the Los Angeles
Summit
It would be inaccurate, however, to present criticisms of U.S.
deportation policies without also pointing out the effort the United
States has made in combating gangs and violent crime in Central
America. The Department of Justice's International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), created in
1986 to respond to requests for law enforcement training in Latin
America, is a U.S. initiative that operates throughout the
world. 195 "ICITAP'S mission is to serve as the source of support
for U.S. criminal justice and foreign policy goals by assisting
foreign government in developing the capacity to provide
professional law enforcement services based on democratic
principles and respect for human rights."'196 Among its main goals
is "the enhancement of capabilities of existing police forces in
emerging democracies . . . based on internationally recognized
principles of human rights, rule of law and modern police
practices,"197 a service badly needed in Central America. ICITAP
currently operates in both El Salvador and Guatemala; however,
194. See, e.g., Fogelbach, supra note 10; Padilla, supra note 11.
195. See Dep't of Just., ICITAP Home Page, http://www.usdoj.gov/
crimina/icitap/.
196. See id.
197. See id. "ICITAP's training and assistance programs are intended to
develop professional civilian-based law enforcement institutions. This
assistance is designed to: (1) enhance professional capabilities to carry out
investigative and forensic functions; (2) assist in the development of academic
instruction and curricula for law enforcement personnel; (3) improve the
administrative and management capabilities of law enforcement agencies,
especially their capabilities relating to career development, personnel
evaluation, and internal discipline procedures; (4) improve the relationship
between the police and the community its [sic] serves; and (5) create or
strengthen the capability to respond to new crime and criminal justice
issues." See id.
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ICITAP's success in these nations is unclear. 198 In regards to the
El Salvador program, officials concede, "The most serious
challenge now facing . . . the Government of El Salvador is the
increasing incidents of violent crime and homicide related to street
(youth) gang violence, which to date has been extremely difficult
to reduce."199
Similarly, in February 2007, U.S. and Central American
officials met in Los Angeles to discuss the problem of gangs. 200
The three-day summit promised to "reflect a new emphasis on
international cooperation in fighting gangs" and "focus on sharing
information to stop gang members from bringing weapons,
criminal plots, and rivalries across borders. ''20 1 U.S. officials
acknowledged the criticism it has received in response to its
deportation policies, and has agreed to reconsider these policies by
creating a new policy fostering anti-gang cooperation between the
U.S. and Central America. 20 2
Therefore, ICITAP and the L.A. Summit reflect U.S. efforts to
stem the tide of gang violence that has destabilized the nations of
Central America.
VII. CONCLUSION
It should be acknowledged that grants of asylum, withholding
of deportation, and relief pursuant to CAT are meant to provide
relief to a finite number of individual claimants who demonstrate
they are most deserving. These remedies, besides creating
attention and interest among the judiciary and legal community,
do little to solve the problem of gang violence in the nations of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Similarly, ceasing the
deportation of gang members, ICITAP, and U.S.-Central American
cooperation represent only defensive measures taken to address
the problem. In reality, only eradication of social and economic
conditions within these three nations can end the dominance of
198. See ICITAP, Project Overviews: El Salvador, http://www.usdoj.govl
criminalicitap/elSalvador.html; ICITAP, Project Overviews: Guatemala,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/icitap/guatemala.html.
199. See id.
200. See L.A. Summit Seeks to Sever International Gang Ties, ASSOCIATED
PRESS Feb. 7, 2007, available at http:lwww.cnn.com/2007[US/O2/O7/gang.
summit.ap/index.html.
201. See id.
202. See id.
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the maras in Central America. 20 3 These remedies however, can
mean the difference between life and death for those who petition
for them. Although petitioners have not had success with asylum
or even withholding of deportation, this comment argues CAT may
provide a worthwhile alternative. The Convention's broad
definition of torture, judicial adoption and application of the
"willful blindness" standard, and an understanding of relevant
country conditions in these three nations could be a powerful
formula for claimants seeking relief from gang violence in El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Monica Fanesi*
203. The USAID Studies conclude with donor responses and international
programs aimed at these goals. See, e.g., USAID STUDY: EL SALVADOR, supra
note 5; USAID STUDY: GUATEMALA, supra note 14; USAID STUDY: HONDURAS,
supra note 28.
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